INTRODUCTION
In the rush to examine and cross-examine Emile Benoit's (1973 Benoit's ( , 1978 conjectures about the relationship of military expenditure and real output growth in less developed countries (LDCs), economists have largely ignored several alarming trends in the size and structure of such spending over the past quarter century.
New, fuller, and better data series now permit us to discern four of these trends, perhaps sufficiently clearly to call them "stylized facts" of the contemporary development process: (1) LDC defense expenditures have risen as a fraction of GDP in the 1970s. For typical LDCs, such expenditures were less than 3% of GDP in the 1950s and 1960s but rose to 4% by 1980 (Section 2).
(2) The capital-cost component of LDC military spending, after falling relative to operating costs in the 196Os, rose rapidly in the 1970s. For typical LDCs, equipment costs comprised less than 12% of total costs over the 1950s and 1960s but had reached nearly 20% of total costs by 1980 (Section 3).
(3) The fraction of the LDC population serving in the armed forces has also risen rapidly in the 1970s. On average, in the 196Os, only onethird of 1% of the population was in the military; by 1980, the percentage had reached nearly onehalf of 1% (section 4).
(4) The LDC military "wage" -more precisely, the operating (i.e., noncapital) costs per warrior relative to civilian income per capitarose dramatically in the 1970s after falling in the 1960s. Although the evidence differs somewhat for different regions of the Third World, the typical LDC lowered the relative military "wage" by 20% in the 196Os, only to raise it back up by that 20% in the 1970s (Section 5).
The data used are from Nicole Ball (1983) of the National Defense Research Institute of Stockholm and contain observations from 48 LDCs for various years over the period 19.50-80. ' The regressions reported here are simply time trends, with the dependent variables being relative deviations from overall own-country means, to allow for country-specific factors. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the results tell us nothing about determinants, only about trends.* They are subject to all the questions always raised by the use of such cross-country, crosstime data. Nevertheless, the trends are sufficiently manifest to suggest the above four stylized facts. These are derived and discussed, in turn, in Sections 2-5, and the relationship between the four is examined in Section 6.
TOTAL SECIJRITY EXPENDITURES
The total national defense expenditures of LDCs are not easy to estimate and, once estimated, are not of much interest by themselves. To be compared with those of other years, they must be deflated for price changes, and the usually available consumer, wholesale, and national product price indices may provide poor substitutes for the usually unavailable deflator for the military bundle of goods and services. To be compared with those of other countries, they must be converted into a common currency (usually US dollars).
The problems of using official exchange rates or purchasing-powerparity estimates are legion, well known, and especially serious for LDCs.
A sensible, if partial, way out of these difficulties is to calculate total security expenditures as a fraction of GDP (hereafter called TSE/ GDP). This is only a partial escape from difficulties for two reasons.
One, interpretation of the ratio as a relative real resource flow is implicitly equivalent to using the same price deflator in both numerator and denominator. Two, comparison of the ratio across countries or across time implicitly assumes an income elasticity of demand for national security of unity as the basis for such comparisons.
The ratio, TSE/GDP, ranges in Ball's sample from barely above zero up to one-fourth (for Jordan in the 1970s). It exceeds 10% persistently for only two countries, Jordan in the 1970s and Saudi Arabia from the mid-1960s to the mid1970s. For the entire sample of 787 observations, the mean value of the ratio, TSE/GDP, is 3.0%. In an effort to look for trends among countries that vary so greatly in their average propensity to spend on national security, the percentage deviation of TSE/GDP from its own-country mean is calculated for each country in each year for which Ball provides data. These deviations are then regressed on time and time squared, for the entire sam r3 le, and for each of the three regions separately.
The regression statistics are shown in Table 1 ; the regression curves are graphed in Figure 1 .4
For the entire sample of countries, and for countries in the Asian and Latin American subsamples, the ratio, TSE/GDP, was stable through the 1950s and 1960s falling slightly in the 1950s and rising slightly in the 1960s. But it rose rapidly in the 1970s with the trend value of TSE/GDP reaching 30-35% above country means by 1980.5 For a typical LDC, for which TSE averaged less than 3% of GDP in the 1950s and 196Os, TSE had risen to 4% of GDP by 1980.
In Africa, on the other hand, the rapid rise in TSE/GDP occurred in the 1960s and the ratio stabilized in the 1970s. Cross-country regressions like these are not the place to locate motivations and income elasticities, but one might want to The trends examined here are those in the ratio of capital costs to the total of operating and capital costs (C/(0 + C)). The importance of country-specific factors in this ratio is great -the overall sample average of C/(0 + C) is 12%) but for Iran in the mid-1970s it rose above 70%, and for many other countries it was consistently close to zero.' Because such country-specific factors are important, the percentage deviation of this ratio from the country's own mean ratio is calculated for each country and for each year for which data are available. This percentage deviation is regressed on time and time squared. The trend regressions are shown in Table 2 , and the regression curves pictured in Figure 2 .8 While the coefficients are significant. the R's are particularly low. Moreover, for these regressions (and for none of the others), the estimates change dramatically as one removes outlying observations.'
In short, the statements of the next few paragraphs are tenuous. For the entire sample and for each of the regions, a U-shaped curve appears. C/(0 + C) is above the country average in the 1950s below it in the 1960s and again above it in the 1970s. LDC militaries were becoming much more capital intensive in the 1970s. The typical LDC, The ratio of armed forces personnel to population, Pers/Pop, is again calculated as a percentage deviation of each available observation from its own-country mean. The regressions on time and time squared are shown in Table 3 , and the regression curves are pictured in Figure 3 . For all, the trend is significantly upward. For Asia, there is little change in the ratio for the 196Os, but there is an accelerated upward movement in the 1970s.
The average ratio of armed forces personnel to population for the entire sample is less than 0.40% (the ratio reaches as high as 3%, for Jordan in the early 1970s). Thus, for a typical country, the regression for the entire sample suggests that the ratio has risen from 0.30% in (-) if not significant at 95% when included. 1960 to 0.47% in 1980 -a rise in the ratio of more than one-half over the past two decades.
THE RELATIVE MILITARY "WAGE"
The military wage rate in LDCs, relative to the average civilian wage rate, is not widely collected information and so to discuss it requires first a search for a reasonable proxy.13 The proxy used here, called the relative military "wage" -in quotation marks throughout to remind us of its inadequacies -is the ratio of military operating costs per warrior to the nation's GDP per capita. For (sort of) short, this is written (Op C/Pers)/ (GDP/Pop).
This proxy ratio -technically (Op C/Pers)/ (GDP/Pop) but called the military "wage" -will be proportional to the true average military wage rate if three conditions are fulfilled within each of the LDCs considered in the sample: (1) the civilian wage share of total national output is constant over time; (2) the labor force is a constant fraction of the population; and (3) military wage payments are a constant fraction of total military operating costs.14 A few words on each are appropriate:
(1) Studies of the functional distribution of income indicate that the wage share of national output changes slowly in most countries. For the less than one-third of a century examined here, constancy is not an unreasonable assumption. But the wage share does rise over longer periods of development and may have risen over 1950-80
as the LDCs in this sample have grown. To that extent, movements of the measured military "wage" will provide an upwardly biased estimate of the true average military wage.
(2) The ratio of the labor force to population also moves slowly for most countries.
Its movement depends on the labor force participation preferences of working-age persons and on the dependency ratio (i.e., the ratio of the numbers of the very young and the very old to the total population).
Examination of these trends indicates that, for most LDCs, the ratio of labor force to population has declined over the past 30 years, largely due to rapid population growth and the resulting growth in the fraction of children in the population.
This also will mean that movements of the military "wage" will provide an upwardly biased estimate of the true average military wage.
(3) The "operating cost" data collected by Ball (1983) include not only wage payments but also other noncapital expenditures.
To the extent that the latter are nonwage income "perks" -such as food, housing, clothing, and off-duty transportwe want them counted into the true military wage. But to the extent that they involve nonconsumption operating costssuch as on-duty transport and ammunition -we should exclude them, If military wage payments, broadly construed, are a rising fraction of total operating costs, then movements of the measured military "wage" will provide a downwardly biased estimate of the true military wage; if military wages are a falling fraction of total operating costs, the "wage" will provide an upwardly biased estimate. I suspect the latter tendency but on the basis of little real evidence. Movements in the relative military "wage" -i.e., (Op C/Pers)/(GDPIPop) -probably overstate the true movements of average military wage rates relative to civilian wage rates. But we will proceed on the assumption that the bias is small enough to be ignored. Only the quotation marks around the word will remain to remind us.
The trends of the military "wage" are reported in Table 4 and displayed in Figure 4 , for the entire sample and for each of the regions. The shapes of these trends across the different regions are quite different -for the first time in these pages. The relative "wage" has fallen steadily in Africa.
risen steadily in Latin America, and exhibited a steep U-shape in Asia. The entire sample shows a milder U-shape.
The trends in each of the regions are consistent with the conjecture that, for the first 20 years or so after independence, LDCs reduce the military wage to move it from the previous colonial structure toward greater consistency with their own postindependence wage structures. Then the relative military wage begins once again to rise.
Such a rise in the relative military wage may simply reflect increased risk or increased need for loyalty. But it does not necessarily mean that the same structure of warriors is increasingly well paid relative to civilians. At least two other explanations leap forth as possibilities. One, the LDC militaries are becoming increasingly hierarchical. An ever higher ratio of chiefs to braves will raise the average wage with no change in any of the wage rates. Two, the increased capital intensity of the LDC militaries has demanded more highly-skilled personnel to operate and maintain it. The higher average military wage may simply reflect the replacement of lowwage unskilled workers with high-wage skilled workers.
INTERRELATIONS OF THE TRENDS
In each of the previous four sections, some way of looking at military expenditure in LDCs has been examined for trends. In each, evidence of a disturbing trend has been uncovered. The exposure of these possible stylized facts has been the main purpose of this paper.
Here 
and hence the estimated 1980 growth rate of Xi is liil(l + rio).
These growth rates are shown in Table 5 . For the entire sample, and for the two regions except Africa, the ratio of capital to total military expenditures was rising at a rate above 5% per annum in 1980. In Asia, the ratio of military personnel to population and the ratio of the average military "wage" to the overall average wage were both rising at rates of 7-g% in 1980. Only in Africa was the ratio of total security expenditures to GDP falling; elsewhere, this ratio was rising at a rate above 3% in 1980. 
Source: Regressions of Tables l-4.
Almost throughout the less developed world, these indicators of relative allocations to defense were rising at rates of 2% to 8% per annum by 1980. The numbers are high, and alarming, but they are only estimates; and the magnitudes of the standard errors of the constant terms in the regressions mean that they are only very rough estimates. One consistency check can be utilized to make this warning clear. The four ratios examined separately in Sections 2-5 are -as alert readers may have noticed -not independent of each other. Algebraic manipulation shows that
provided that (0 + C) = TSE, as in principle it should.15 In fact, (0 + C) is often smaller than TSE because expenditures that Ball was unable to allocate were included in TSE but neither in 0 nor in C. Ignoring this, taking logarithms of equation (4) and differentiating, one reaches a growth rate identity:
where G (.) means estimated percentage growth rate of the parenthetical ratio. The averages over 1960-80 of the two sides of equation (5) are shown in Table 6 . The right-hand side is higher in every sample except that for Asia.16 This second (i.e., right-hand) estimate in Table 6 of the same variable -the average growth rate over 1960-80 of TSElGDP -reemphasizes the roughness of these trend calculations, but offers no suggestion that the earlier estimates were too high. (5) 3. The regional groupings are those selected by Ball. She counts also the region "Middle East," but it includes only two countries and is hence not used here. The data for these two countries are in the "entire sample." 4. The horizontal axis of all of the graphs shown here is Year-1980, the same time variable that aupears in the 6. Maizels and Nissanke (1986) speculate on interregional differences in the determinants of this military expenditure as a percentage of GDP.
7. For nearly one-fifth of the observations, the ratio was less than 2%.
8. Notice that the number of observations usable in these regressions is fewer than in Table 1 . While I think we should use all the data available, Appendix B reworks all the text regressions using only the observations common to all. 12. For a review of the testing of Benoit's hypothesis, see Grobar and Porter (1989) .
13. This entire section refers to the average military wage rate. A change in the hierarchical structure of the military will change this even with no change in any military pay rates.
14. The first and second of these three conditions could be avoided by using some average (say, industrial) wage rate as the denominator (in place of GDP/Pop).
While it is easy to find such series for most LDCs, it is not easy to be sure that they are comparably calculated across countries.
15. Almost -remember, R & D expenditures are excluded from (0 + C) but not from TSE; but such R & D is small in LDCs. See Ball (1983) passim.
A part of the difference
can be attributed to the failure of (0 + C) to equal TSE. (Ironically, despite ever improving LDC data services, Ball experienced increasing rath>r than decreasing difficulty over 1950-80 allocatine TSE between 0 and C.) The weak fit of the C/(0 +-C) regressions accounts'for much of the difference. The principal source of the data is Ball (1983) . The tive information for total security expenditure in only data sources and problems are described fully there and 804 cases." hence need only brief discussion here. The data cover There are two advances made by this data effort -48 less developed countries (LDCs) and various years beyond the sheer number of LDCs and years covered: over the period 1950-80. These were the countries for which "it was possible to obtain data which (1) Security expenditures are disaggregated. The covered much of that period" (Ball, 1983, p. 34 But one would feel even more uncomfortable if the results were highly dependent on the vagaries of the sample size. So the regressions for the entire sample (of complete observations) were repeated for each of the four ratio variables discussed in Sections 2-5. These regressions are given in Table B -l, and the regression lines are pictured in Figure B -l. Most noticeable is that the regressions never involve a significant quadratic time-trend term. But recall that all of the data from the 1950s are discarded in this reduced sample since no military personnel data are available before 1961. Two decades are just not long enough to produce significant curvature in the trends. But the genera1 slopes are very similar for the 1960s and 1970s in Figure B -l and in the previous four figures (for the "entire sample" regressions).
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The only exception is the military "wage" regression, which here has a slight and insignificant negative slope. 
Year -1980
Figure B-l. Regressions on sample of complete observations.
